If 2025 was the ‘hinge year’, as argued in our Year-in-Review commentary, we contend that 2026 may be the first year to cease being anchored in the solid framework of eight decades of the rules-based international order spanning security, commerce, and climate governance. What had long appeared as gradual erosion now risks becoming structural detachment—a state in which attachment persists but alignment no longer does. From today’s perspective, this shift is no longer merely implied. It is articulated explicitly in the US National Security Strategy (NSS) of November 2025, which seeks to ‘reestablish strategic stability with Russia’—the aggressor in the war against Ukraine—while portraying transnational institutions as vectors of ‘sovereignty-sapping incursions’. Recent territorial revisionism and alliance stress-testing by the current US administration vis-à-vis other NATO members—including renewed language that tests Greenland’s status and right of self-determination within the Danish Realm—are not isolated incidents, but signals of a strategic posture that treats the foundational principles of European security as negotiable rather than binding.
China, meanwhile, is not waiting for the old order to collapse; it is actively shaping the contours of its successor. Through the development of parallel regional institutions and US-dollar-independent payment systems, the strategic deployment of finance, and the weaponisation of technological ecosystems—semiconductors, artificial intelligence, data governance, and critical infrastructure—, Beijing advances a model in which power is exercised through the combination of redefined rules and asymmetric dependencies. It is precisely on this technological terrain that the post-idealist turn takes its most tangible form. Control over standards, platforms, supply chains, and computational capacity has become as decisive as territory or alliances once were. In such a system, institutional erosion does not yield chaos, but hierarchy.
Against this backdrop, Europe occupies an anchor position. The now explicit objective of redefining the continent as a ‘group of aligned sovereign nations’ (NSS), led by far-right parties styling themselves as ‘patriotic European’, points towards a deliberate weakening—if not dismantling—of the European Union’s political, economic, and military capacity to act as a guardian of multilateralism. This strategy also carries a pronounced soft-power dimension, targeting the EU’s role as a constraining counter-model of open, democratic, social-market societies with the latent capacity to compete in the race for technological leadership. In this divide-and-rule logic, American and Russian post-idealist rhetoric, their rising political and financial influence on the illiberal right in Europe, and policy actions undermining inherited security guarantees can have mutually reinforcing effects in Europe, creating openings that China, as a systemic competitor of the US, is well placed to exploit even where interests do not fully converge. Yet the EU remains—together with Japan, South Korea, Canada, and other non-US Western democracies—the principal actor for whom the survival of rules-based cooperation is existential rather than merely instrumental. Whether Europe, challenged internally by stagnant growth, a growing distance from the knowledge frontier in key technologies, intensifying political polarisation, and elevated public debt, consolidates into a geopolitical counterweight or fragments under internal and external pressure will therefore be decisive in determining whether 2026 marks the consolidation of a post-idealist order, or the last effective resistance to it.
In this sense, 2026 will reveal whether sufficient cohesion still exists among states, institutions, and alliances to impose meaningful constraints on power—or whether the international system settles into a new equilibrium defined by realist politics, bounded only by counterpower.
Prediction 1. Crisis governance becomes the default mode
In key dimensions of global governance, the hinge from erosion to irreversibility is expected to be crossed.The next twelve months will determine whether the institutional erosion observed in 2025, both nationally and multilaterally, becomes entrenched. What was previously treated as circumstantial slippage now risks crossing a threshold at which reversal becomes structurally difficult. This is most visible in the gradual unravelling of the legal layer of governance: selective compliance with court rulings, the instrumentalisation—or quiet disregard—of sanctions regimes, and an expanding practice of jurisdiction shopping. Once such precedents normalise, law no longer constrains power; it merely decorates it. Rules persist formally, but their binding force erodes, replaced by discretionary interpretation aligned with executive interest.
In parallel, emergency politics becomes increasingly normalised. Crisis governance—initially justified by financial instability, pandemic, or war—has shifted from exception to default. Parliaments are increasingly marginalised, budgetary authority diluted, and executive discretion reframed as a prerequisite for ‘stability’. Large, omnibus legislative packages—marketed as efficiency-enhancing or security-driven—concentrate authority in ways that recall earlier historical moments of democratic self-suspension, albeit under contemporary legal and technocratic cover. Minority governments, unresolved budget processes, and recurring states of exception reinforce this dynamic, allowing emergency instruments to substitute for political consensus.
Security policy plays a central legitimising role in this transformation. War preparedness, rearmament, and hybrid threat narratives function as political shields, insulating executive action from scrutiny while narrowing the space for contestation. At the same time, advances in technological capability—surveillance, data integration, artificial intelligence, and platform control—expand the capacity for governance through control rather than consent. The result is not necessarily overt authoritarianism, but a quieter mutation towards a system in which democratic forms remain intact while substantive constraint gives way to permanent crisis management.
This development sits first because it sets the tone for everything that follows—reflecting the oft-quoted warning of Benjamin Franklin’s, founding father of the United States, to those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety: they would ‘deserve neither liberty nor safety’. Rather than being independent shocks, fragmentation, geopolitical realignment, fiscal exhaustion and social polarisation are symptoms of a deeper shift in how power is exercised and justified when crisis becomes the governing logic rather than the exception.
Prediction 2. Elections will serve as a test of state capacity and democratic credibility
Elections across advanced democracies will mark a shift in the function of democratic contestation—from choosing policy preferences to testing whether democratic parties retain the credibility and problem-solving capacity required to govern under tightening fiscal, climate, and security constraints. Elections are unlikely to produce radical outcomes everywhere, but they will increasingly adjudicate whether states and supranational organisations, including the European Union, still possess the administrative coherence, fiscal room, and legal authority required to govern at all. In this sense, electoral processes will measure not only partisan preference, but the resilience—or fragility—of democratic systems simultaneously confronted with budgetary constraint, security pressures, and social polarisation.
The US mid-term elections will represent the most consequential such test. Their significance will extend well beyond legislative control or policy direction. At stake will be the operability of the institutional system itself, spanning the credibility of electoral administration, the continuity of federal governance, and the independence of regulatory agencies and courts. A further stress point will be whether monetary policy—under rising political pressure on the Federal Reserve—remains insulated from partisan capture (with direct implications for the stability of the global financial system anchored in the US dollar). A contested or delegitimised outcome would not merely deepen polarisation; it would weaken the state’s capacity to act coherently at home and abroad, accelerating the drift from law-based governance towards discretionary executive management.
In Europe, the two state elections in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania will serve as a genuine stress test. Should current polling for the Alternative für Deutschland translate into seats and illiberal majority constellations that give it direct or indirect influence over the state executive, the far right would—for the first time in post-war Germany—gain access to key political levers, and with them real veto power. The central risk is that nationalist actors would thereby acquire de facto blocking power over core policy fields such as fiscal legislation, internal security, education policy, and EU-facing positioning. Via the Bundesrat—Germany’s federal upper chamber—individual Länder can slow down or block federal policy, thereby impairing administrative capacity at the federal level. Such outcomes would test Germany’s ability to preserve political coherence precisely at a moment when fiscal discipline, amid higher defence spending and the need for tighter European coordination, becomes an existential question of state capacity.
France represents a distinct but equally critical case. The sustainability of governance under a minority administration, persistent budgetary deadlock, and the increasing normalisation of rule by decree raise the probability of renewed snap elections. These, in turn, carry a non-trivial risk of a breakthrough for the Rassemblement national, either legislatively or in the run-up to the next presidential contest. The issue here is not electoral volatility per se, but whether the French state can continue to reconcile fiscal consolidation, social stability, and European commitments without triggering a more profound legitimacy rupture.
At the European level, a related stress test is unfolding through the progressive erosion of the informal cordon sanitaire (or Brandmauer in German) that has long constrained far-right parliamentary forces. Recent voting patterns in the European Parliament—most visibly the alignment of centre-right groups with far-right counterparts on EU supply‑chain due‑diligence rules, alongside expanding cooperation on migration, climate, and regulatory files—signal a shift from principled exclusion to opportunistic accommodation. This evolution reflects less an ideological convergence than the hard logic of electoral arithmetic and legislative paralysis under conditions of constraint.
Politically, this strategy facilitates the gradual normalisation of majorities that include illiberal actors, while remaining partly shielded from public scrutiny— not least because the European Parliament can operate beneath the radar of national publics. What is framed as pragmatic problem-solving at the European level thus functions as a low-visibility rehearsal space for cooperation that would remain politically costly at the national level. The effect is a stepwise lowering of thresholds towards routine collaboration at both supra- and subnational levels—incrementally advancing the objective, explicitly articulated by parts of the US political establishment, of reframing Europe as a ‘group of aligned sovereign nations’.
The politico-institutional consequences are substantial. As the cordon sanitaire frays, far-right forces gain agenda-setting influence, committee leverage, and de facto veto capacity without assuming the accountability burdens of formal executive participation. Influence is gained without ownership, and power exercised without responsibility. The result is not democratic inclusion through contestation, but asymmetric incorporation that rewards obstruction while diluting collective responsibility. For the EU and its Member States, this marks a decisive transition from norm-based boundary enforcement to functional accommodation of illiberalism. The risk is not merely procedural drift, but a deeper erosion of democratic credibility: systems that internalise anti-pluralist actors risk internalising their governing logic as well. In this sense, the European Parliament may increasingly function as a laboratory for rendering similar majorities politically acceptable at the national level—softening taboos, normalising transactional alliances, and accelerating the diffusion of illiberal governance across the EU.
The ultimate force of these dynamics will be tested most clearly at the national level. Hungary’s parliamentary elections due in spring 2026 will either consolidate—or potentially arrest—the advance of nationalist, authoritarian, and Eurosceptic governance in Europe. Taken together, and as developed further in Prediction 3, Europe’s fragmented electoral calendar risks acting as a multiplier of existing stresses: elections increasingly intersect with fiscal exhaustion, defence commitments, and migration pressures, amplifying instability rather than resolving it. The cumulative effect may be a weakening of collective European action precisely at a moment when external pressures demand the opposite.
The unifying lens for 2026, therefore, is elections as legitimacy adjudication under constraint. Where earlier cycles were primarily about distribution and ideology, upcoming contests will increasingly determine whether democratic systems retain the authority—and capacity—to take difficult decisions at all. In this sense, electoral outcomes will not merely shape policy trajectories; they will signal whether democratic governance remains functional under conditions of scarcity, or whether legitimacy itself becomes the next casualty of the post-idealist order.
Prediction 3. The political economy of scarcity: fiscal stress, distribution, and governability
Fiscal stress is likely to translate increasingly into crises of governability, as constrained public finances trigger political deadlock, distributive conflict, and the expanded use of emergency fiscal and executive measures across advanced democracies. Rising public debt, tighter financing conditions, and competing expenditure priorities will no longer merely limit policy ambition; they will directly test state capacity and, correspondingly, democratic legitimacy. As governments confront a widening gap between societal expectations and budgetary realities, fiscal stress risks hardening into legitimacy crises, social unrest, and intensified political polarisation.
In this context, public debt functions as a budgetary constraint as much as a political accelerant. Tightening labour-market conditions and widening distributional imbalances make this politically combustible. In many advanced economies undergoing deindustrialisation, job security has weakened even where headline employment remains resilient. Work has become more precarious, bargaining power has diminished, and the benefits of innovation—linking productivity increases to wages—have become more unevenly distributed, in clear violation of the social contract that has underpinned social-market economies promising ‘Prosperity for All’ (Ludwig Erhard, 1957). When median incomes stagnate while asset values and high-end wealth increase, fiscal restraint is perceived less as prudence than as abandonment, fuelling anti-system politics and widening the legitimacy gap.
High debt levels, rising interest burdens, and shrinking fiscal buffers reinforce perceptions of democratic powerlessness—particularly when combined with visible and competing demands for increased defence spending, climate investment, and social protection. Budget crises and distributive conflicts over welfare retrenchment, defence–versus–social-welfare trade-offs, and the expansion of industrial subsidies will therefore move from the realm of technocratic adjustment into the centre of political contestation. In several advanced economies, fiscal policy will no longer operate primarily as a stabilising instrument; instead, it will become a focal point of political division, constraining the capacity of democratic parties to forge pragmatic compromise over clearly identified policy challenges. The cumulative effect is a further erosion of public trust in the polity itself, as fiscal constraint is increasingly experienced not as a shared limitation to be managed collectively, but as evidence of systemic incapacity.
The US illustrates a distinct, but systemically consequential, variant of this dynamic. Rather than adjusting fiscal commitments to domestic constraints, emerging US policy thinking increasingly seeks to externalise fiscal pressure through trade, currency, and institutional leverage. Proposals associated with Stephen Miran’s (2024) blueprint for restructuring the global trading system—including the aggressive use of tariffs, selective capital controls, and implicit pressure on dollar-based financial arrangements—frame fiscal sustainability as a function of geopolitical dominance rather than domestic adjustment. In practice, this approach risks transforming fiscal stress into an instrument of international coercion, shifting adjustment costs onto allies and trading partners while further politicising the global monetary and trade architecture. For 2026, the testable question is whether these ideas translate into durable policy outcomes: a more explicitly weaponised trade regime, greater tolerance for financial fragmentation, and a readiness to subordinate multilateral institutions to domestic fiscal expediency.
France, by contrast, highlights the governability risks of scarcity in their most acute domestic form. A state without a stable parliamentary majority, operating under recurring budgetary stalemate and increasing reliance on executive decree, embodies the limits of democratic governance under fiscal constraint. The French case is emblematic not because it is exceptional, but because it anticipates pressures likely to surface elsewhere: when fiscal consolidation collides with social resistance and institutional rigidity, democratic legitimacy erodes even in long-established systems.
A critical and underappreciated risk for 2026 lies not in sovereign insolvency, but in liquidity and financial-infrastructure fragility. Stress is likely to emerge less through outright defaults than through disruptions in funding markets, collateral chains, sovereign spreads, and the non-bank financial sector. Such strains tend to escalate rapidly, forcing discretionary interventions by central banks and treasuries that stretch—or bypass—existing mandates. When liquidity crises demand action without clear legal or democratic authorisation, emergency governance risks becoming entrenched, reinforcing the dynamics identified in Prediction 1.
The political consequences are immediate. Liquidity stress translates quickly into fiscal paralysis, contested bailouts, and distributive conflict, amplifying public distrust in institutions perceived as protecting systems rather than citizens. As a result, fiscal scarcity feeds directly into electoral volatility, executive overreach, and the normalisation of crisis politics—creating a self-reinforcing loop between economic constraint and democratic erosion. The central test for 2026, therefore, is whether democratic systems can re-establish credible fiscal governance under conditions of scarcity without resorting to permanent exception. Failure to do so would not merely constrain policy choices; it would undermine the social contract that anchors democratic authority itself. In this sense, the political economy of scarcity is not a discrete chapter alongside elections or geopolitics—it is the connective tissue linking democratic legitimacy, institutional resilience, and the broader transition towards a post-idealist order.
Prediction 4. Geopolitical alignment will fuel the erosion of Western cohesion
Western cohesion is more likely to erode through selective alignment and transactional security than through formal alliance rupture, as legal and institutional frictions within the alliance system are increasingly politicised. The ‘West’ is unlikely to collapse as a formal construct in 2026; its internal coherence, however, is likely to erode to the point at which shared strategy, mutual restraint, and institutional trust can no longer be presumed. Alignment will become selective, contingent, and increasingly reversible. Even where treaties remain in force, their operational meaning will be renegotiated case by case—varying by issue-area, partner, and perceived utility. The result is a weakening, to the benefit of Russian and Chinese strategic objectives, of collective deterrence, rule-based coordination, and normative authority.
Prediction 4 captures the transition from alliance erosion as a background condition to alliance fragility as an active strategic variable. In 2026, alignment will no longer be presumed; it will be contested, conditional, and transactional. The testable question by year’s end is whether Western institutions retain sufficient cohesion to manage disagreement without systemic breakdown—or whether alignment itself becomes another casualty of the post-idealist order.
Prediction 5. The development of new multipolar platforms and non-US dollar payment systems
Alternative financial platforms and payment arrangements will gain political relevance as instruments of alignment and leverage, weakening US dollar dominance. A discontinuous risk, however, is a direct political confrontation over monetary policy that materially impairs the Federal Reserve’s perceived independence; were that to occur, ‘optionality’ could accelerate into more abrupt monetary fragmentation alongside current BRICS plans. Otherwise, the preparation for a BRICS ‘unit’, a currency basket of gold and the five original BRICS member countries’ currencies, might tip from political signalling to serious challenges to an alternative to a US dollar-centred monetary order. Absent an institutional crisis over effective central-bank independence in the US, further BRICS measures are expected to aim at contesting US dollar exclusivity, undermining perceptions of inevitability, and widening the strategic space for countries seeking insulation from Western conditionality. In this sense, the BRICS unit operates as a wedge to weaken confidence in the permanence of dollar dominance without being able to offer a functional substitute.
In these efforts, the New Development Bank (NDB) plays a complementary role. Framed as a ‘neutral’ financing alternative, it gains traction precisely as Western conditionality hardens around debt sustainability, governance, climate, and, increasingly, security criteria. For borrowing states, the appeal lies less in interest rates than in optionality—the ability to signal alignment flexibility and to negotiate terms across competing blocs. The NDB thus functions as alignment infrastructure: not replacing Bretton Woods institutions, but diluting their leverage by offering credible outside options.
These Chinese-led reforms give the Global South, especially regional middle powers, additional bargaining strength, allowing its governments to see intensified issue bundling in 2026. Climate finance, debt restructuring, market access, and geopolitical positioning are increasingly negotiated as a package rather than as separate domains. Multipolar platforms provide the institutional scaffolding for this strategy, enabling states to arbitrage between Western and non-Western offers, a political art currently perfected by Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or key member countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. A critical addition in 2026 will be food and fertiliser politics. Export controls, subsidy regimes, and strategic reserves are increasingly deployed as bargaining tools, particularly in regions vulnerable to price volatility and supply disruption. Control over agricultural inputs becomes an extension of geopolitical leverage, reinforcing the logic of scarcity analysed in Prediction 3.
This forecast describes a world in which fragmentation advances not through abrupt monetary rupture, but through the accumulation of alternatives. Dollar dominance may survive 2026 in formal terms, but its disciplining power weakens as politico-institutional uncertainty in the US and Europe expands. Optionality grows; coordination erodes. Together with Predictions 3 and 4, this dynamic prepares the ground for a further shift in 2026: the movement from financial leverage towards the direct weaponisation of physical and technological interdependence—addressed in Prediction 6.
Prediction 6. Strategic infrastructure will serve as key instruments in the weaponisation of interdependence
Strategic infrastructure will no longer function primarily as a facilitator of economic exchange, but increasingly as an instrument of political leverage. Global interdependence will continue to be segmented, securitised, and manipulated. Trade routes, energy transits, digital networks, and population movements will be treated less as shared systems to be stabilised than as pressure points to be exploited. This marks a qualitative escalation from the financial optionality described in Prediction 5 to the direct coercion of physical and technological interdependence.
Trade policy will continue its transformation from economic instrument to security architecture. Tariffs, export controls, and ‘friend-shoring’ initiatives increasingly function as tools for zoning supply chains into political spheres rather than optimising efficiency. Rerouting of trade flows—whether through regulatory exclusion, customs friction, or selective enforcement—will be justified explicitly on national-security grounds. Beyond the expectation of higher average tariff levels in 2026, it is the routinisation of trade discrimination as a security practice—with economic cost treated as acceptable collateral—that is expected to be the defining trajectory. It will transform trade from being a growth engine to becoming a boundary-making device.
Energy insecurity in 2026 is less likely to arise from physical sabotage than from disruptions in the infrastructure ecosystem surrounding transit. Shipping insurance withdrawals, port-access restrictions, compliance uncertainty, and regulatory risk will increasingly function as de facto blockades without formal declaration. Maritime chokepoints, pipeline networks, and electricity interconnectors become zones of deniable escalation. The critical shift is from supply disruption to risk amplification: energy continues to flow, but at politically manipulated cost, volatility, and uncertainty.
Critical infrastructure such as subsea cables, satellites, ports, and logistics hubs will increasingly double as a coercion layer or targets of hybrid warfare. They are not only critical assets, but also vulnerabilities. In 2026, pressure is more likely to take the form of regulatory intervention, licensing delays, insurance exclusions, cyber interference, or contractual disputes than overt attack. Attribution remains ambiguous; escalation remains deniable. The cumulative effect is a system in which connectivity persists, but reliability degrades—raising the strategic value of redundancy and political alignment over efficiency.
Artificial intelligence that the US seeks to maintain as a geopolitical monopoly will act as a force multiplier across these dynamics. Economically, AI accelerates labour-market polarisation, creating concentrated productivity gains alongside widespread job displacement. The distributional effect is not incidental: it concentrates income and wealth in firms and among the tech-oligarchy able to monetise data, compute, and market power, while widening the insecurity of routine and mid-skill work. Politically, this occurs precisely as fiscal constraints—outlined in Prediction 3—limit governments’ ability to compensate losers. The result is a widening gap between technological transformation and social absorption capacity. At the same time, AI expands the toolkit of governance through control: surveillance, predictive policing, targeted welfare conditionality, and narrative amplification. In 2026, the interaction between AI-driven dislocation and constrained fiscal space will sharpen social conflict while lowering the political cost of repression.
Migration will increasingly be treated not as a humanitarian or demographic phenomenon, but as an instrument of political propaganda and polarisation. Selective border enforcement, visa regimes, and asylum processing will be used as bargaining tools in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. ‘Weaponised migration’—whether through facilitation, obstruction, or threat—allows states to exert pressure without formal sanctions. Domestically, migration will continue to function as a master narrative that unlocks securitisation, fiscal exceptionalism, and legitimacy claims. By end-2026, a key indicator will be the frequency with which migration flows are explicitly linked to concessions on trade, aid, or security cooperation.
Why 2026 could become ‘Year One’
As macro-fiscal, monetary, and institutional leverage becomes less decisive or more contested in 2026, reflecting the fragilities in the economic foundations of all the major powers, pressure will be shifting further towards infrastructure, technology, and migration. Coercion becomes quieter, more deniable, and more continuous. Conflict thresholds blur, with escalations becoming incremental. By normalising coercion through infrastructure, technology, and mobility rather than open confrontation, 2026 risks entrenching a system in which power is constrained not by shared rules, but only by counter-power and resilience. This is the defining condition of the post-idealist order.
The principal threat for 2026 is not a single rupture but the consolidation of a pattern: institutions and alliances remain, while the commitments that give them binding force become conditional. If that pattern holds, the system shifts from binding rules that constrain to conditional rules that legitimise the exercise of power; from automatic solidarity to negotiated support; and from interdependence as a stabiliser to interdependence as a pressure device.
The six dynamics above describe how such an equilibrium could become self-reinforcing. Crisis governance normalises discretion and weakens legislative constraint. Elections become adjudications of administrative credibility under scarcity rather than mandates for programme politics. Fiscal stress hardens distributive conflict and incentivises procedural bypass, while liquidity shocks can accelerate discretionary interventions that corrode legitimacy. Western cohesion weakens through selective alignment, as conditionality and legal and institutional frictions migrate into open political confrontation. Monetary ‘optionality’ grows through the accumulation of alternatives that dilute leverage without yet replacing the dollar system. And coercion increasingly travels through the seams of connectivity—insurance, licensing, compliance risk, platforms, logistics, data—where pressure can be continuous, deniable, and difficult to deter.
Put plainly, 2026 may be the year in which the post-idealist order stops appearing as drift and begins to function as a system—an order of managed asymmetries in which restraint is imposed primarily by counter-power and resilience rather than by shared principle. The decisive test by the end of 2026 will not be rhetorical alignment or formal treaty survival, but whether rule-breaking continues to carry predictable and enforceable costs. These costs may take different forms—legal invalidation, market penalties, financial exclusion, political isolation, or credible security consequences—but they must be sufficiently automatic to constrain behaviour rather than merely legitimise it after the fact.
If violations of territorial integrity, treaty obligations, judicial rulings, fiscal rules, or alliance commitments are absorbed without material consequence—managed through exemptions, discretionary waivers, selective enforcement, or negotiated exceptions—then 2026 will mark the point at which conditionality replaces obligation as the default grammar of governance. If, by contrast, a critical mass of states and institutions succeeds in re-establishing non-negotiable costs for procedural bypass and rule-breaking—across security, trade, finance, and law—then 2026 may yet be remembered not as ‘Year One’, but as the moment when the post-idealist order was tested and, narrowly, contained. This outcome would depend not on rhetorical commitment, but on the capacity and willingness of states and institutions to prioritise enforcement over accommodation—allocating increasingly scarce fiscal, administrative, and political resources to the defence of clearly defined rules rather than to their discretionary management.
Jan-Peter Olters
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