When looking back at the year 2024, then in the full knowledge of the electoral outcomes in the EU and the US, migration policies will have exposed themselves as the Achilles’ heel of Western democracies. Up until then, many more people will have lost their livelihoods as the result of wars, conflicts, and climate catastrophes, exacerbating the dynamics of global refugee migration. Meanwhile, the public debate on migration policies—deepening systemic credibility crises—remains wedged in short-term, often ideologised approaches. Whilst the insistence on a fundamentally open but otherwise reactive migration policy risks overburdening state budgets and (municipal) infrastructures, the empathy-free ‘zero immigration’ policy of sealing off borders shifts violence and misery to external borders, hence fuelling regional instability.
Burning refugee camps, brutal push-backs and drowning people have shed harsh light on the European dilemma between noble aspiration and bitter reality. These reports and images of (alleged) human rights violations have led the European Commission (2020) to call for a ‘new, durable European framework’ that could ‘provide certainty, clarity and decent conditions for the men, women and children arriving in the EU’ and would ‘allow Europeans to trust that migration is managed in an effective and humane way, fully in line with [European] values.’ Whilst balancing on the precarious foundation of ‘strategic partnerships’ to curb irregular migration, EU bodies appear to allow the European election campaign to divert political dynamics towards tokenism that would dilute—beyond recognition—the Commission’s erstwhile assurance of efforts to manage migration to Europe effectively and humanitarianly.
The unenthusiastic reaction across the entire electoral spectrum to this form of political subcontracting mirrors the scepticism that a thus-anchored European immigration policy could be implemented in a (politically and economically) sustainable manner. To be able to demonstrate long-term success, it is essential that interests of all those directly affected by migration are taken into account, allowing them to derive an economic benefit from corresponding policies:
A migration policy conceived in this way is possible; it must, however, be re-conceived. One possible approach, which has been discussed under the heading ‘Cities, not Camps’, including by Lokshin and Olters (2022) and Nooke et al. (2022), draws on economic and, in some cases, historical experiences with special economic areas and free cities. It thus places the private sector at the centre of the debate, aimed at developing a coherent and holistic approach to humanitarian aid and social, economic, and development policies. The central instrument would be the designation of urban revitalisation areas in previously neglected districts (inner cities or banlieues). These would be based on a clearly defined legal framework with economic incentives (lower tax rates and/or leaner bureaucracy) as well as state guarantees for good governance and the prioritised allocation of public goods. It is not necessarily necessary—as originally called for by Romer and Fuller (2010)—to build new ‘Cities from Scratch’. Urban revitalisation areas would be designed to promote private-sector involvement, career prospects, and the financial independence of those currently excluded from the primary labour market due to poverty, the lack of formal education, or residence status. In such a framework, the integration of people seeking protection (and/or their preparation for future employment in the eventual reconstruction of their home countries) could be combined with targeted social policies aimed at transforming run-down neighbourhoods into hip economic centres.
Social benefits rather than public costs
From the refugees’ perspective, urban revitalisation areas offer a place of safety, a peer-to-peer network, tailored vocational training, streamlined accreditation procedures, and legal options to shorten otherwise lengthy administrative processes. The key to a successful model lies in the balance between local self-government and a public guarantor (usually the government of the host country), which secures framework conditions, regulates special rights, and ensures the security of investments and property. This must take place at a centralised political level to regulate the interaction between political bodies and their respective funding. Central to this is the involvement of all residents, irrespective of passports, in the organisation of local institutions.
In combination, legal certainty, streamlined regulations, lower taxes, and an efficient urban infrastructure would create an attractive business climate. This would make companies that had previously avoided these neighbourhoods want to invest there—for reasons of economics and social responsibility. This, in turn, would create new employment and earning opportunities for the residents, benefitting the local population and refugees alike. They would all profit from the special rights, public investments, and economic opportunities created. This ‘economic integration’ would help to promote general political acceptance, increase a society’s willingness and ability to accept refugees, and tip the longer-term balance of social benefits and tax revenues in the interest of the public purse.
Education, medicine, and social services
Wars and climate disasters mean that the majority of those seeking protection come from relatively few countries. Therefore, a particular socio-political value of these urban revitalisation areas lies in the possibility of offering social services (especially in the sensitive areas of medicine and education) in the respective national languages, with the involvement of specialist staff who are among the refugees. This would offer those with professional training and experience in their home countries the opportunity of a job and a task in these priority sectors. They would be able to cater specifically to the special needs of the new arrivals.
The current legal situation makes this difficult. However, the regulations of urban revitalisation areas could be drafted in a way that refugees would receive work permits limited to these areas and gain access to accelerated procedures for professional (re-)accreditation, ad interim (and based on their local qualifications). Allowing (re)qualified professionals to work in their professions within (and later outside) the urban revitalisation areas would bring direct welfare benefits to the individuals themselves and the communities they serve. Schools could be staffed by native-speaking teachers, reducing the likelihood that children drop out of school and become a forgotten generation (and potentially vulnerable to extremism).
Ultimately, this argument applies to almost all professions. Just as medical personnel could ensure care in the native language, refugees from skilled trades and/or willing to be trained could be involved in urban revitalisation, potentially in preparation for follow-up work in the eventual reconstruction of their respective home countries. At the same time, the development of a corresponding civil society with (informal) networks would reduce the risk of child labour, sexual exploitation, and religious radicalisation, to which marginalised immigrant groups with language barriers and unclear integration prospects are particularly exposed.
Changed public perception
A well-managed urban revitalisation area would help neglected and underserved neighbourhoods that had previously been plagued by high rates of unemployment and poverty and the lack of professional prospects to receive a new lease of life. The increasing economic integration of urban revitalisation areas into (supra-)regional economies would create further investment incentives and employment opportunities for residents in the neighbouring districts and regions. This would result in a fundamental change in the public perception of refugees. They would be valued as workers, employees, entrepreneurs, and taxpayers instead of as social-welfare recipients and competitors for low-rent housing and low-skill jobs.
With the expected upward trend in the number of refugees fleeing wars and climate disasters, the political urgency to tackle seriously the ‘new, sustainable European framework’—as called for by the EU Commission—is increasing. Admittedly, the start-up financing for a socio-political investment in urban revitalisation areas is not trivial. However, the direct and indirect costs (current and future) of migration and social policies, including the potential loss of tax revenues, must be set against this. The Damocles’ sword of migration could thus be forged into an economic policy instrument that can protect the Achilles’ heel of Western democracies through the assurance of political and economic sustainability.
Jan-Peter Olters
powered by Borlabs Cookie